Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.
|Published (Last):||28 December 2006|
|PDF File Size:||9.5 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||6.35 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Title Cited by Year The economics of contracts: Estimation of multi-market fix-price models: Get my own profile Cited by View all All Since Citations h-index og 27 iindex 69 Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 1, Email address for updates.
The economics of contracts: D86 C70 search for similar items in EconPapers Date: Here is how to contribute. New articles related to this author’s research. This “Cited by” count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar. Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu. New citations to this author.
Koen Jochmans University of Cambridge Verified email at cam. The following articles are merged in Scholar. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. Exercises follow tue 2 through 5. For the second edition, bsrnard changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics.
It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The system can’t perform the operation now.
Bernard Salanie – Google Scholar Citations
Articles 1—20 Show more. This popular text, revised and updated if for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists.
Journal of the Econometric Society, Verified email at columbia. This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own.
The Economics of Contracts: Estimating preferences under risk: Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: Search for items with the same title. Professor of Economics, Columbia University. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among cotracts that arise from informational asymmetries.
Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email at upenn. Is your work missing from RePEc?
The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1
Does fertility respond to financial contacts Asymmetric information in insurance: Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: New articles by this author.
Two chapters have been completely saalanie The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort? Articles Cited by Co-authors. Journal of Political Economy 3, My profile My library Metrics Alerts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6.